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A jury's awareness about a defendant's eligibility for parole
can have a profound effect on the sentence that it imposes on the
defendant. Empirical studies show that this knowledge can
literally be a matter of life and death. A typical "death qualified"
juror' believes that a "life sentence" carries with it a possibility
of parole, and, as a result, is more likely to sentence the defen-
dant to death.2 This phenomenon presents a compelling fairness
rationale for fully informing all capital juries of the defendant's
t B-. 1994, Amherst College; J.D. Candidate 1997, The University of Chicago.
All jurors in capital cases must be "death qualified." That is, they must be willing
to impose the death penalty. Those morally opposed to the death penalty are not allowed
to be on capital juries and are screened out at voir dire.
' See Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions
in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L Rev 1, 7-9 (1993) ("Jurors who believe the alternative to
death is a relatively short time in prison tend to sentence to death."); W. Bowers, Capital
Punishment and Contemporary Values: People's Misgivings and the Court's
Misperceptions, 27 L & Soc'y Rev 157, 167-71 (1993) ("[J]urors who underestimate the cur-
rently available alternative are more apt to impose the death penalty."); William M. Hood,
HI, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital
Sentencing, 75 Va L Rev 1605, 1606, 1620-25 (1989) (recounting survey that found that
"residents of Prince Edward County, Virginia, who are eligible for capital juries .. .
[b]elieve that a capital defendant sentenced to life imprisonment will likely serve only ten
years before being released on parole"). See generally Anthony Paduano and Clive A.
Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition
of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 211, 211-14 (1987) (asserting that jurors
who are "laboring under this misconception that a sentence of 'life' is a ticket to 'get out of
jail free'" are more likely to vote for death).
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parole status. Several states, however, left by the Supreme Court
to decide this issue for themselves, 3 have chosen not to give
juries this information. Even when juries care enough to inquire
specifically about a defendant's parole status, judges in these
states decline to answer.
Recognizing this phenomenon, the Supreme Court delivered
a simple and noncontroversial opinion in Simmons v South
Carolina.4 The Court held that when the prosecutor rests his
case for the death penalty on the defendant's future dangerous-
ness, and where the defendant is ineligible for parole, due pro-
cess requires that the jury be informed that the defendant is
ineligible for parole, even though state law otherwise prevents
the jury from considering parole eligibility.5 Although the justic-
es disagreed on the Constitutional basis for the decision and the
scope of the rule announced,' the case was not a difficult one: A
prosecutor must not be able to mislead jurors into believing that
the defendant, who will never be eligible for parole, will one day
pose a danger to society if not sentenced to death. In dissent,
Justices Scalia and Thomas agreed that there was a need to
avoid prosecutorial misconduct but did not agree that it had
occurred in this case.
While the Supreme Court faced a rather easy decision in
Simmons, lower courts have confronted a much more difficult
task in addressing the dozens of Simmons claims that have
subsequently come before them. These claims come in two variet-
ies. First, defendants whose convictions were not final at the time
of the Simmons decision seek the benefit of the rule in Simmons
on direct appeal.! Second, defendants whose convictions were
final at the time of Simmons seek to use it to make a collateral
attack on their death sentences.
See California v Ramos, 463 US 992, 1014 (1983) ("[T]he wisdom of the decision to
permit juror consideration of [post-sentencing contingencies] is best left to the States.").
4 114 S Ct 2187 (1994).
5 Id at 2195-96 (plurality).
6 Six justices decided the case under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Souter, concurring, thought that the Eighth Amendment also man-
dated the result. See Sections IA. and I.B.
' A conviction becomes final when the defendant has exhausted his direct appeals.
Until the conviction becomes final, the defendant can benefit from any case law creating
new rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions without having to worry about issues of
retroactivity. Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314, 328 (1987). For instance, a defendant who
was convicted prior to the Simmons decision but whose direct appeal had not yet been
heard when the Court decided Simmons could raise a Simmons claim.
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With respect to the first type of claim, the Simmons decision
left a number of questions unanswered. What, for example, con-
stitutes an argument about a defendant's future dangerousness?
Must a defendant have been technically ineligible for parole or
practically ineligible for parole? Is eligibility at the age of 125
good enough? Finally, must the defendant have objected to the
argument in order to preserve it for appeal?
According to Justice Souter's concurring opinion, the Eighth
Amendment's requirement of heightened reliability in capital
cases mandates that juries know all relevant information about a
capital defendant, including parole availability.' It follows that
Simmons should be applied generously to cases on direct appeal.
Despite Justice Souter's logic and the arguments of commenta-
tors,' however, the majority of lower courts have read Simmons
quite narrowly. With only a few exceptions, courts have refused
to apply Simmons unless the defendant is technically ineligible
for parole, the prosecutor rests his case for the death penalty on
the defendant's future dangerousness, and the defense attorney
raises a timely objection or asks for an instruction.
After reviewing cases brought under the first type of claim,
this Comment focuses on the second type of claim arising from
Simmons: those from defendants whose convictions were final at
the time of Simmons. These defendants seek to use Simmons to
make a collateral attack on their death sentences, that is, to
challenge the validity of their sentencing after they have ex-
hausted their direct appeals. With respect to these claims, the
fundamental question is whether Simmons should be applied
retroactively.
The retroactivity of Simmons in a federal habeas claim must
be examined under the exacting standard of 28 USC § 2254(d), as
recently amended. ° The new habeas statute provides that feder-
al courts may not grant relief to state prisoners "unless the [state
court] adjudication of the claim... resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clear-
s Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2198-99 (Souter concurring).
9 See, for example, Janie Clark, Note, Putting an End to the Imposition of Death by
Misperception and Misunderstanding: Simmons v. South Carolina, 43 U Kan L Rev 1147
(1995).
" Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 104(3), Pub L No 104-132,
110 Stat 1214, 1219 (1996). After exhausting their direct appeals, state prisoners have
two avenues of recourse. First, they may seek relief under state post-conviction relief stat-
utes. Then, they may seek federal habeas relief. 28 USC § 2254(d) sets the retroactivity
standard only for federal habeas claims. States are free to set their own retroactivity
standards, although many follow the federal habeas standard.
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ly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States."" Although Congress did not explicitly say
so, the new statute appears to codify the Supreme Court's contro-
versial decision in Teague v Lane.'2 In Teague, the Court severe-
ly limited the number of rules that apply retroactively in habeas
cases. Under Teague, "new rules" of law will not be applied retro-
actively; 3 a rule is "new" if the result was not "dictated" by pre-
cedent.14 Teague also provided two exceptions, which the new
statute has apparently preserved, s under which new rules will
be applied retroactively. One exception, perhaps applicable to
Simmons, is for "watershed rules of criminal procedure" that
affect the accuracy of the sentence. s Despite some strong dicta,
under which everything would be a new rule and nothing would
" 28 USC § 2254(d)(1).
12 489 US 288, 307-10 (1989). Teague itself was about retroactivity; that is, Teague
addressed when a defendant can benefit from a legal decision handed down after his
conviction became final. The new statute apparently makes Teague the standard of review
on habeas for all state court determinations of federal law. In Wright v West, 505 US 277,
291 (1992) (plurality), Justice Thomas anticipated this development, describing Teague as
establishing a "deferential" standard of review for state court determinations of federal
law. See text accompanying notes 104-06. Congress did not address this issue and said
very little to clarify its intent in revising § 2254(d). In Lindh v Murphy, 1996 US App
LEXIS 24136 (7th Cir) (en banc), however, Judge Easterbrook examined the relationship
between Teague and § 2254(d). Judge Easterbrook described § 2254(d)(1) as "codiffying]
and extend[ing] the Teague standard." Id at *44. He explained:
The novelty in this portion of § 2254(d)(1) is not the 'contrary to' part but the refer-
ence to 'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' This
extends the principle of Teague by limiting the source of doctrine on which a federal
court may rely in addressing the application for a writ.
Id at *3". In order to secure a writ under the new standard, therefore, a habeas petitioner
must point to an "authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." Id at *34. Because I argue
that Simmons was compelled by two Supreme Court decisions, the new statute, as inter-
preted by the Seventh Circuit, does not alter my analysis. The Seventh Circuit's conclu-
sion that the new standard codifies Teague is not surprising since the courts have strug-
gled for seven years to work out the kinks in Teague and because Teague is firmly estab-
lished as the retroactivity standard. Given this history, other courts are likely to follow
Lindh. when I refer to the Teague standard in this Comment, I am referring to the §
2254(d) standard. A more detailed discussion of § 2254(d) and its relationship to Teague is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
13 489 US at 310 (plurality).
14 Id at 301. As Section II. and I.B. explain, the exact definition of these terms has
been the subject of heated debate in the Supreme Court.
"5 See 28 USC § 2254(e)(2). Under the new statute, a petitioner can at least gain an
evidentiary hearing if his claim relies on a "new rule of constitutional law, made retroac-
tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavail-
able...."
16 See also Teague, 389 US at 313 (plurality) (discussing scope of exception); Sawyer v
Smith, 497 US 227, 241 (1990).
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apply retroactively,'7 the Court has not made the Teague bar
insurmountable. In fact, in two of the three capital cases involv-
ing retroactivity issues since Teague, the Court has applied rules
retroactively.
Whether courts will apply Simmons retroactively remains
uncertain. In opinions beset with confusion, lower courts have
misapplied Teague and reached inconsistent results. Courts
should resolve the disagreement by applying Simmons retroac-
tively under either of two rationales. Under the first rationale,
courts should apply Simmons retroactively because it is not a
new rule-a careful analysis of Simmons and its precedents
shows that the Court's holding was dictated by Gardner v
Floridai" and Skipper v South Carolina.9 Alternatively, even if
the Court were to find that Simmons is a new rule, it should
nevertheless apply Simmons retroactively. Empirical studies
demonstrate that the application of the Simmons rule has an
effect on the sentence imposed by the jury." Because inmates
sit on death row as a result of judges' refusals to remedy mis-
leading prosecutorial arguments with accurate sentencing infor-
mation, the Simmons rule should apply retroactively under
Teague's "watershed rule" exception.
Section I of this Comment lays out the facts of Simmons and
examines the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. This
Section then describes the lower courts' treatment of Simmons
claims arising on direct appeal and identifies the scope of the
rule announced in Simmons. Section II of this Comment then
sets out the Court's retroactivity doctrine. Finally, Section III
argues that Simmons should be applied retroactively, even under
the exacting standard of 28 USC § 2254(d).
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN SIMMONS V SOUTH
CAROLINA
Simmons was charged with the first-degree murder of seven-
ty-nine year-old Josie Lamb. Because Simmons confessed to sexu-
ally and physically assaulting elderly women on three prior
" See, for example, Butler v McKellar, 494 US 407, 415 (1990) (concluding that
because prior decision was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" it announced
a "new" rule).
18 430 US 349 (1977).
' 476 US 1 (1986).
' See note 2 and accompanying text.
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occasions, under South Carolina law, he was ineligible for parole
if convicted.2'
At trial, the jury convicted Simmons of first-degree murder,
rendering him ineligible for parole. At sentencing, the prosecutor
urged the jury to consider Simmons's future dangerousness in
deciding his punishment. Specifically, the prosecutor argued that
the "question for the jury ... was 'what to do with [petitioner]
now that he is in our midst."' He added that a death sentence
"would be a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your
verdict will be an act of self-defense."2 Simmons's counsel re-
quested a jury instruction explaining that a life sentence meant
Simmons could not be released on parole. The judge refused.23
Clearly, though, the jury was concerned about Simmons's
eligibility for parole. After ninety minutes of deliberation, the
jury sent a note to the judge asking: "Does the imposition of a life
sentence carry with it the possibility of parole?" The judge replied
that parole was not an issue for the jury to consider and that
"[t]he terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be un-
derstood in their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning." Twenty-five
minutes later the jury returned a sentence of death.24
To determine exactly what the Supreme Court held in
Simmons-and how courts should read Simmons in future cas-
es-requires sorting through the four different opinions. Justice
Blackmun's plurality opinion contains broad language that would
impose a number of requirements on the trial judge and the
prosecutor. Justice O'Connor's and Justice Ginsburg's concurring
opinions, as well as Justice Scalia's dissent, however, specifically
repudiate this broad language and confine the holding to its
facts. Under these three opinions, Simmons would provide relief
to defendants only under very specific circumstances.
21 Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2190. Eligibility for parole is governed by state law. In
South Carolina, "[the board [of Probation, Parole and Pardon] must not grant parole nor
is parole authorized to any prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent convic-
tion, following a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for violent crimes .... " SC
Code Ann § 24-21-640 (Law Co-op 1989 & Supp 1995).
' Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2190-91. Significantly, the prosecutor made only generalized
arguments about Simmons's future dangerousness. He did not explicitly argue to the jury
that Simmons would kill again if they did not give him the death penalty.
' Id at 2191-92. Under South Carolina law, a jury is not to receive any information
about the defendant's parole eligibility. State v Norris, 285 SC 86, 328 SE2d 339 (1985).
Pursuant to South Carolina law, prior to jury selection, the trial judge granted the State's
motion to prohibit the defense from mentioning the subject of parole or asking prospective
jurors whether they understood what "life imprisonment" meant under South Carolina
law. Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2190.
24 Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2192.
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A. Justice Blackmun's Plurality Decision
Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Blackmun over-
turned Simmons's conviction under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun wrote that "where the
defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law pro-
hibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that
the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole
ineligible.""
The plurality relied on two earlier Supreme Court decisions,
Gardner v Florida"5 and Skipper v South Carolina.27 In
Gardner, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death based
on a pre-sentence investigative report that the defendant did not
have an opportunity to see. The Court held that the defendant
was denied due process of law because his sentence "was im-
posed, at least in part, on the basis of information which [the
defendant] had no opportunity to deny or explain."28 In Skipper,
the trial judge had refused to admit evidence of the defendant's
good behavior in prison during the sentencing phase of the trial.
Citing Gardner, the Skipper Court held that "[w]here the prose-
cution specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness
in asking for the death penalty," both the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause require the admission of evidence
showing "that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared
(but incarcerated)."29
The plurality in Simmons concluded that the defendant had
been sentenced to death on the basis of information he had no
opportunity to "deny or explain," in violation of the Due Process
Clause. They reasoned that Simmons was sentenced to death, at
least in part, on the basis of the prosecution's future dangerous-
ness arguments that the defendant had no opportunity to re-
but.30
Id at 2190 (plurality). Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg.
26 430 US 349 (1977).
476 US 1 (1986).
Gardner, 430 US at 362.
Skipper, 476 US at 5 & n 1.
'o Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2192-93 (plurality). The plurality declined to consider wheth-
er the Eighth Amendment also mandated the decision. Id at 2193 n 4.
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B. Concurring Opinions
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote separately to
emphasize his belief that the outcome in the case was also man-
dated by the Eighth Amendment, insofar as it requires a height-
ened standard of reliability in capital cases. As part of this
heightened standard, jurors must fully comprehend their sentenc-
ing options.31 The Eighth Amendment therefore "mandates rec-
ognition of a capital defendant's right to require instructions on
the meaning of the legal terms used to describe the
sentences.., a jury is required to consider."3 2
Justice Souter also said that a mere argument by defense
counsel was not sufficient to satisfy the demands of the Eighth
Amendment. Instead, the Eighth Amendment mandates that the
trial judge instruct the jury regarding parole eligibility.33 This is
similar to Justice Blackmun's instruction that the jury must be
"informed" of the defendant's parole eligibility. 34 These opinions,
therefore, indicate that a prosecutor's future-dangerousness argu-
ment will not only open the door for a defense counsel argument
but will compel the trial judge, in the absence of such an argu-
ment, to instruct the jury regarding the defendant's eligibility for
parole.3
5
Justice Ginsburg and Justice O'Connor each wrote separately
to emphasize the narrowness of the Court's holding. For Justice
Ginsburg, this case involved the "core requirement of due pro-
cess, the right to be heard."36 This requirement is satisfied if the
defense counsel is given the opportunity to rebut the future-dan-
gerousness argument. 7
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy, also wrote separately-probably in reaction to
the potentially broad scope of the Court's language. Although she
never explicitly disagreed with anything in the plurality opinion,
Justice O'Connor identified the applicable precedents and charac-
terized the holding of the case in a narrow manner." She wrote,
" Id at 2198 (Souter concurring).
3 Id.
' Id at 2198-99.
Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2190 (plurality).
In fact, Justice Souter said that the Eighth Amendment's heightened standard for
capital cases requires the trial judge to instruct the jury on the defendant's parole eli-
gibility in every such case. Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2198-99 (Souter concurring).
' Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2199 (Ginsburg concurring).
37 Id.
' Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2200-01 (O'Connor concurring).
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"Where the State puts the defendant's future dangerousness in
issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, due process enti-
tles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury-by ei-
ther argument or instruction-that he is parole ineligible."39
C. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Although the exact basis of Justice Scalia's dissent is un-
clear, he appears to have disagreed with the plurality primarily
on factual grounds. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
acknowledged the plurality's basic premise-that a defendant
may not be sentenced to death on the basis of information he has
no opportunity to deny or explain." In Justice Scalia's view, how-
ever, Simmons did not present such a factual situation. Instead,
he concluded, "it was the sheer depravity of those crimes, rather
than any specific fear for the future, which induced the South
Carolina jury to conclude that the death penalty was justice."41
Moreover, Justice Scalia argued that the reference to "self-de-
fense" alluded to all members of society, including other prison-
ers.
42
Like Justice Ginsburg, Justice Scalia expressed concern
about the breadth of the plurality opinion: "It purports to be a
determination that any capital-sentencing scheme that does not
permit jury consideration of [parole eligibility] is so incompatible
with our national traditions of criminal procedure that it violates
the Due Process Clause .... "4 Since the "national practice"--or
at least the practice of many states-is not to inform the jury
about parole, a defendant has no due process right to have the
jury so informed.4 Justice Scalia would only find a constitution-
al mandate to inform the jury of the defendant's parole ineligibil-
ity if the prosecutor makes an argument about parole.45
3 Id at 2201.
o Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2202 (Scalia dissenting).
4' Id at 2202-03. If Scalia's dissent is really based on factual grounds, then arguably
the Court unanimously approved at least a narrow rule allowing the defendant to raise
parole ineligibility when the prosecutor rests his case for death on an argument of future




45 Id at 2204.
1996] 1581
The University of Chicago Law Review
D. Simmons in the Lower Courts
This Section examines the impact of the rule in Simmons by
identifying which group of defendants has actually benefited from
the Court's decision in Simmons." Understanding the impact
and scope of the rule lays the foundation for the discussion in
Section III about retroactivity in two respects. First, examination
of the lower courts' narrow reading of Simmons identifies who
would benefit from the retroactive application of the rule. Second,
the narrow scope of the rule provides a reason why courts should
apply it retroactively: since the rule applies only to a small class
of prisoners, retroactive application would not produce a flood of
claims.
1. State court parole eligibility.
Understanding the impact of Simmons requires an apprecia-
tion of the way state courts treat information about parole eligi-
bility. Prior to Simmons, the Supreme Court provided little guid-
ance as to what information was proper for a jury to have. Al-
though common sense might indicate that a jury should always
be informed of a defendant's parole eligibility,47 the Court gener-
ally left this determination to the states," and the states have
developed quite different policies. A brief examination of these
policies indicates that the impact of Simmons will be limited to a
handful of states.
' Several commentators have discussed the Simmons decision, but mostly in terms
of what the impact of the decision should be, rather than what the impact actually has
been or will be. See Clark, Note, 43 U Kan L Rev at 1148 (cited in note 9) (arguing that
"[t]he Court should have held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require a
capital sentencing jury to be informed, upon request of either prosecution or defense, of a
defendant's parole status"); John Christopher Johnson, Note, When Life Means Life:
Juries, Parole, and Capital Sentencing, 73 NC L Rev 1211, 1233 (1995) (arguing that the
Supreme Court should have decided the case under the Eighth Amendment because "due
process only allows a jury instruction on parole ineligibility when the prosecution argues
future dangerousness of the defendant, whereas the Eighth Amendment holding would
require such an instruction whenever the jury is likely to be confused about the
defendant's parole status"). One commentator noted the early impact of Simmons in the
lower courts but still focused on the Simmons decision itself. See Mary Zaug, Note,
Simmons v. South Carolina.- Safeguarding a Capital Defendant's Right to Fair Sentencing,
26 Loyola U Chi L J 511, 513 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court "may eventually
extend Simmons to require states to allow capital defendants to inform sentencers of
parole ineligibility in all cases").
"' Even Justice Scalia admitted as much in his Simmons dissent: "[The regime
imposed by today's judgment is undoubtedly reasonable as a matter of policy .....
Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2205 (Scalia dissenting).
' California v Ramos, 463 US 992, 1014 (1983).
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The forty-one states that currently have the death penalty
fall into distinct categories. Eight states mandate that the court
inform the jury of a capital defendant's parole status or at least
allow defense counsel to do so at his discretion.49 In five other
states, a judge or panel of judges decides whether a defendant
will receive a capital sentence. ° In these thirteen states, then,
the sentencing authority is aware of the precise parole status of
defendants. Simmons will therefore have no impact on the capi-
tal sentencing procedures in any of these states.
In ten other states, the jury may choose only between death
and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.5 Here
again Simmons is inapplicable since the jury is presented with
only two choices, neither of which includes the possibility for
parole.
Eight states allow the jury to decide whether a defendant
should receive the death penalty or some variation of life impris-
onment.52 Simmons is unlikely to have an impact in any of
' The eight states are Georgia, see Ga Code Ann § 17-10-31.1(d) (Michie Supp 1995);
Florida, see Standard Jury Instructions-Criminal Cases, No. 92-1, 603 S2d 1175, 1201
(Fla 1992) (jury informed that sentencing options are death or life in prison without
possibility of parole for 25 years); Illinois, see People v Gacho, 122 Ill 2d 221, 522 NE2d
1146, 1166 (1988) (jury informed that options are death or natural life, which means no
possibility for parole but possibility of executive clemency); Mississippi, see Turner v
State, 573 S2d 657, 673-75 (Miss 1990) (holding that at the sentencing phase, "the jury
shall be entitled to know by instruction whether the defendant is eligible for parole"); New
Jersey, see State v Martini, 131 NJ 176, 619 A2d 1208, 1277-80 (1993), cert denied 116 S
Ct 203 (1995) (Jury must be fully informed of defendant's prior sentences either on the
defendant's request or in the event of a jury inquiry.); New Mexico, see Clark v Tansy,
118 NM 486, 882 P2d 527, 533 (1994) (Jury must be informed if the prosecution raises
future dangerousness, and if the defense so requests.); and North Carolina, see NC Gen
Stat § 15A-2002 (Michie 1988 & Supp 1995) ("The judge shall instruct the jury... that a
sentence of life imprisonment means a sentence of life without parole.").
In Maryland, the defense has the option to inform the jury of the defendant's eligibil-
ity for parole. Doering v State, 313 Md 384, 545 A2d 1281, 1295 (1988). If Simmons were
read to mandate a trial court instruction, and not a defense counsel argument, the Mary-
land procedure might be impacted.
' The five states are Arizona, see Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-703(B) (West 1989 & Supp
1995); Colorado, see Colo Rev Stat § 16-11-103(1)(a) (West 1990 & Supp 1995); Idaho, see
Idaho Code § 19-2515 (Michie 1987 & Supp 1995); Montana, see Mont Code Ann § 46-18-
301 (1995); and Nebraska, see Neb Rev Stat § 29-2520 (1985).
51 The ten states are Alabama, see Ala Code § 13A-5-46(e) (Michie 1994); Arkansas,
see Ark Code Ann § 5-4-603(a), (b) (Michie 1993); California, see Cal Penal Code § 190.3
(West 1988); Connecticut, see Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-46a(f) (West 1994 & Supp 1995);
Delaware, see 11 Del Code Ann § 4209(a) (Michie 1995); Indiana, see Ind Code Ann § 35-
50-2-9 (West 1986 & Supp 1995); Louisiana, see La Code Crim Proc Ann art 905.6 (West
1984 & Supp 1996); Missouri, see Mo Ann Stat § 565.030 (Vernon Supp 1996); New
Hampshire, see NH Rev Stat Ann § 630:5 (Equity 1986 & Michie Supp 1995); and Wash-
ington, see Wash Rev Code Ann § 10.95.030 (West 1990 & Supp 1996).
' The eight states are Kentucky, Ky Rev Stat Ann § 532.030 (Michie 1990); Nevada,
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these states either. This is because, in light of the jury's ability to
choose among at least three options, the defendant is, technically,
eligible for parole. Of course, a court in one of these states could
read Simmons as Justice Souter does and require that a jury be
informed of the defendant's parole status in every instance.
Six states allow the jury to choose between death and life
imprisonment, without specifying what life imprisonment means.
Among these states, all but Kansas do not permit the jury to be
informed about defendants' parole ineligibility.53  Simmons
should have the greatest impact in these states.' However, as
the following discussion will make clear, even in these states, the
impact is limited.
2. Limited applicability in the lower courts.
Having identified the states in which Simmons can have an
impact, the discussion turns to what exactly this impact has
been. In his Simmons dissent, Justice Scalia expressed his fear
that the Simmons decision was "the first page of a whole new
chapter in the 'death-is-different' jurisprudence."55 He criticized
the Court for creating a "Federal Rules of Death Penalty Evi-
dence," rules that the Court would craft "at great expense to the
swiftness and predictability of justice."56
So far, Justice Scalia's fears have proven misplaced. Instead
of following the spirit of the decision, most lower courts have
applied Simmons formalistically and only to a narrow class of
see Nev Rev Stat § 175.554 (1995); New York, see NY Crim Pro Law § 400.27 (10)
(McKinney Supp 1996); Ohio, see Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2929.03(C)(2) (Baldwin 1993 &
Supp 1996); Oklahoma, see 21 Okla Stat Ann § 701.10 (West 1983 & Supp 1996); Oregon,
see Or Rev Stat § 163.105 (Supp 1994); Tennessee, see Tenn Code Ann § 39-13-204(a)
(Michie 1991 & Supp 1995); and Utah, see Utah Code Ann § 76-3-207(4) (Michie 1995)
(Jurors first vote on death. If they do not vote unanimously in favor of death, they vote on
life in prison without possibility of parole. If they do not vote unanimously for this option,
the judge sentences the defendant to life in prison with the possibility for parole.).
The six states are Kansas, see Kan Stat Ann §§ 21-4624, 21-4706(c) (1995); North
Dakota, see State v Peltier, 21 ND 188, 129 NW 451, 452 (1910); Pennsylvania, see Com-
monwealth v Henry, 524 Pa 135, 569 A2d 929, 941 (1990); South Carolina, see State v
Norris, 285 SC 86, 328 SE2d 339 (1985); Texas, see Jones v State, 843 SW2d 487, 495
(Tex Crim App 1992), cert denied 507 US 1035 (1993); and Virginia, see Eaton v Common-
wealth, 240 Va 236, 397 SE2d 385, 392 (1990).
' Two other states have not made a decision regarding what parole information a
jury should receive. The two states are South Dakota, see SD Cod Laws § 24-15-4 (Michie
1988); and Wyoming, see Wyo Stat §§ 6-2-101(b) (Michie 1988 & Supp 1995), 7-13-402(a)
(Michie 1995).




cases.57 These courts have found a number of different ways to
limit the applicability of Simmons.
3. Future dangerousness argument required.
First, courts have required that, in order for Simmons to
apply, the prosecutor must build his case for the death penalty
on the defendant's future dangerousness. 8 In so doing, these
courts have rejected Justice Souter's Eighth Amendment argu-
ment that a jury must always be informed of a defendant's parole
status. Since the plurality refused to decide the issue, this limit
on Simmons is not surprising.
4. The requirement of technical parole ineligibility.
Second, lower courts have applied Simmons only where the
defendant is technically ineligible for parole. These courts refuse
to apply Simmons to the defendant who receives a sentence that
will keep him in jail until the age of 150, rendering him practi-
cally ineligible for parole, if not legally ineligible. In State v
McLaughlin, for example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
refused to find error, where, during deliberation, the trial judge
refused to answer the jury's question about whether the imposi-
tion of three consecutive life sentences would render the defen-
dant ineligible for parole. 9
' Thus far, only one court has given Simmons the kind of broad reading urged by
commentators and feared by Justice Scalia. In Clark v Tansy, 118 NM 486, 882 P2d 527,
529-30 (1994), the New Mexico Supreme Court remanded the defendant's case after the
prosecutor relied on Clark's future dangerousness in his argument for the death penalty.
The defendant was not legally eligible for parole until the age of 86. Citing the concurring
opinion of Justice Souter, the New Mexico court held that:
The length of incarceration facing a capital defendant before he can be considered for
parole, as an alternative to a death sentence, is information that must be provided to
a jury before it deliberates on the capital charge if the defendant decides it is in his
best interest to have the jury apprised of this information.
Id at 533.
' See People v Franklin, 167 Ill 2d 1, 656 NE2d 750, 760 (1995), cert denied 116 S Ct
1357 (1996) (rejecting Simmons claim because "the prosecution did not place the
defendant's future dangerousness at issue during the second stage of the sentencing
hearing"); State v Southerland, 447 SE2d 862, 868 (SC 1994), cert denied 115 S Ct 1136
(1995), overruled on other grounds, State v Chapman, 454 SE2d 317, 320 (SC 1995)
("Here, the solicitor specifically agreed not to argue Southerland's future dangerousness.");
Fleming v State, 265 Ga 541, 458 SE2d 638, 639-40 (1995) (Trial court's refusal to allow
defendant to use expert testimony to rebut prosecution's statement that sentencing appel-
lant to death will deter others from crime does not fall under rationale of Simmons.).
' State v McLaughlin, 341 NC 426, 462 SE2d 1, 16 (1995), cert denied 116 S Ct 956
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Similarly, in Allridge v Scott, the Fifth Circuit refused to
allow the defendant to present expert testimony that he would
almost certainly be ineligible for parole.60 The court said that
the defendant's parole ineligibility was a "matter of fact" not a
"matter of law," explaining that "the Court made clear in
Simmons [that] the 'logic and effectiveness of petitioner's argu-
ment naturally depended on the fact that he was legally ineligible
for parole."'' The court concluded that evidence that a defen-
dant is ineligible for parole as a matter of law is "inherently
'truthful'" and can "positively deny future dangerousness," where-
as evidence of ineligibility as a matter of fact is "purely specula-
tive."6
2
Although this analysis might apply where the defendant
could indeed come up for parole in 20 or 30 years, such a me-
chanical application of Simmons is illogical if the defendant
would not come before a parole board for 100 years. Moreover, if
the prosecution makes an argument that the defendant might
pose a threat to society, the defendant should be able to respond
with the argument that he might never be released on parole.
After all, if a defendant is ineligible for parole until age 120, the
likelihood of his release on parole is no more speculative than an
argument that he will pose a future threat to society.
The absurdity of this narrow reading of Simmons is most
evident in a recent Fifth Circuit opinion affirming a federal con-
viction for a drug-related killing. In United States v Flores, the
court refused to apply Simmons although the defendant was
ineligible for parole under the federal sentencing statute.63 The
court concluded: "[b]ecause the Sentencing Guidelines vest the
district court with discretion to adjust a life sentence downward,
a life sentence was not the only legal sentence other than death
that [the defendant] might receive."" In essence, the court's
opinion may be taken to mean that Simmons would never apply
to a federal capital case, since the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
always vest the district court with such discretion.
(1996).
41 F3d 213, 220-22 (5th Cir 1994), cert denied 115 S Ct 1959 (1995).
61 Id at 221-22, quoting Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2194-95 (emphasis added by Allridge).
Allridge, 41 F3d at 222 (internal citation omitted).




5. The importance of requesting a jury instruction.
Lower courts can narrow the scope of Simmons in another
way. Simmons leaves unclear whether a defense counsel must
request a jury instruction on parole ineligibility or whether the
judge must deliver such an instruction sua sponte if the judge
believes Simmons to be applicable. As noted above, the plurality
in Simmons speaks broadly about the defendant's right to have
the jury informed of parole ineligibility.65 The Court suggested
that the judge has the responsibility to deliver the instruction
even in the absence of a defense counsel request. The concurrenc-
es of Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg, however, seem to indicate
that the prosecutor's argument about future dangerousness mere-
ly opens the door for the defense to rebut that argument with
evidence of the defendant's parole ineligibility, where state law
would otherwise prevent defense counsel from making such an
argument (as in South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Texas,
and North Dakota).6"
Although few courts have spoken on this issue, it could have
great ramifications. Many defendants who might otherwise bene-
fit from the rule in Simmons may be precluded from doing so
because their attorneys fail to raise the argument at trial. This
was evident in a recent Eleventh Circuit case in which the court
dismissed a Simmons argument in a footnote.67
In sum, the Simmons decision will affect the capital sentenc-
ing procedures in only a handful of states where the jury is pre-
sented with the options of death and life imprisonment, and life
imprisonment is not defined. In those states, the impact of
Simmons is limited to cases in which the prosecutor puts the
defendant's future dangerousness at issue, the defendant is tech-
See Section IA.
Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2199 (Ginsburg concurring); Simmons, 114 S Ct at 2200-01
(O'Connor concurring).
' Ingram v Zant, 26 F3d 1047, 1054 n 5 (11th Cir 1994), cert denied 115 S Ct 1137
(1995) ("[The rule in Simmons] does not help [the defendant] in this case because he never
requested the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the significance of life imprison-
ment."). See also Del Vecchio v Illinois Department of Corrections, 31 F3d 1363, 1385 n 5
(7th Cir 1994), cert denied 115 S Ct 1404 (1995) ("Here Del Vecchio never requested an
instruction similar to the one the South Carolina court rejected in Simmons.").
This issue is further clouded by a petitioner's argument of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Is counsel ineffective for failing to raise an objection to prosecutorial and judicial
conduct that was in line with the law as it stood at that time? For two different answers
to that question, compare Carpenter v Vaughn, 888 F Supp 658, 665 n 4 (M D Pa 1995)
(recognizing the viability of Simmons claim couched in an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim), with Commonwealth v Christy, 540 Pa 192, 656 A2d 877, 889 (1995), cert denied
116 S Ct 194 (1995) (rejecting such a claim).
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nically ineligible for parole, and the defense attorney raises a
timely objection or asks for an instruction. Since these circum-
stances are rare, the retroactive application of Simmons would
affect only a small group of death row inmates.
II. THE RETROACTIVITY STANDARD IN CAPITAL CASES
The last Section discussed the scope of Simmons and the
circumstances in which it applies on direct review. But the rule
in that case will also affect some inmates whose convictions have
already become final. These inmates may raise a Simmons claim
if the court allows retroactive application of the rule. To under-
stand how a court would approach the retroactivity of Simmons,
it is necessary to understand the Supreme Court's current ap-
proach to retroactivity, specifically in the capital context. 28 USC
§ 2254(d) sets the current standard of review for all state claims.
It provides that federal courts may not grant relief to state pris-
oners "unless the [state court] adjudication of the
claim... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."68
This is apparently a codification of Teague v Lane.69 The Teague
standard was then extended to capital cases in Penry v
Lynaugh. ° In subsequent cases, the Court further clarified the
Teague standard. Teague and its progeny create a strong pre-
sumption against retroactivity, and these cases contain some
strong dicta under which no rule would be applied retroactively.
28 USC § 2254(d)(1). For a discussion of the prior statute, see note 12.
489 US 288 (1989). See note 12 for a discussion of the relationship between Teague
and the new statute. Teague v Lane sets the retroactivity standard for federal courts
hearing habeas claims. State courts hearing claims under state post-conviction relief
statutes are free to follow Teague or to set their own retroactivity standards even on the
issue of the retroactivity of a federal constitutional rule like Simmons. See generally Mary
C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State
Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala L Rev 421 (1993) (urging states to adopt generous post-
conviction remedies). One group of states has acknowledged its independence on this front
but has nevertheless followed Teague. See, for example, Taylor v Whitley, 606 S2d 1292,
1296-97 (La 1992); State v Slemmer, 170 Ariz 174, 823 P2d 41, 48-49 (1991); State v
Zuniga, 336 NC 508, 444 SE2d 443, 446 (1994); Daniels v State, 561 NE2d 487, 489 (Ind
1990); Brewer v State, 444 NW2d 77, 81 (Iowa 1989).
A few states have chosen to reject Teague. See, for example, Cowell v Leapley, 458
NW2d 514, 517-18 (SD 1990); Meadows v State, 849 SW2d 748, 754-55 (Tenm 1993). This
comment only examines the retroactivity of Simmons under the Teague standard; the
analysis, therefore, applies to federal habeas cases and to state post-conviction cases in
states following Teague.
70 492 US 302, 313-14 (1989).
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Nevertheless, as this Section demonstrates, the Court has not
made the Teague standard insurmountable.
A. Retroactivity in Habeas Cases: Teague v Lane and the "New
Rule" Standard
After years of uncertainty, the Supreme Court resolved the
question of retroactivity in Teague v Lane.7 In Teague, the
Court set out an exacting standard for retroactivity in cases on
collateral review, that is, in cases in which defendants seek to
overturn their final convictions.72
Under Teague, retroactivity in habeas cases is decided as a
threshold matter before looking at the merits of the case."3 Ac-
cording to the Court, this was the only way to treat like cases
alike.74
According to Teague, courts must determine retroactivity in a
two-step process. In the first step, a court must decide if the rule
in question is a "new rule" or merely an extension of an old rule.
If the rule is new, then it will not be applied retroactively unless
it falls within one of Teague's exceptions.75 The difficult question
is what constitutes a new rule. In Teague, the Court said that "a
case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or impos-
es a new obligation on the States or the Federal Govern-
ment.... To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final."76
If a court decides the rule in question is a new rule, the court
must then proceed to the second step of the Teague analysis:
71 489 US 288, 305-10 (1989) (plurality), citing Mackey v United States, 401 US 667,
682-84 (1971) (Harlan concurring and dissenting).
' Dozens of critics have attacked the Teague standard. See, for example, Joseph L.
Hoffmann, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v.
Lane, 1990 BYU L Rev 183; Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus and the
Death Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 Duke L J 160 (1991); Markus Dirk Dubber, Pru-
dence and Substance: How the Supreme Court's New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mir-
rors and Affects Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 Am Crim L Rev 1 (1992); Linda
Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters': Teague and New Rules, 61 U Chi L Rev 423 (1994).
Although the Teague standard suffers from severe deficiencies, it is firmly entrenched as
the law in federal habeas cases and is the leading paradigm for state retroactivity rules.
Thus, this Comment address the retroactivity of Simmons under the Teague standard.
Teague, 489 US at 300-01 (plurality).
7' Id at 305 (pointing to the unfairness of treating similar retroactivity claims differ-
ently because of the time the claim reached court).
75 Id at 310.
76 Id at 301. In subsequent cases, the Court tinkered with this definition but has still
not come up with a satisfactory formulation. See Section II.B.
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determining whether the new rule falls within either of two rec-
ognized exceptions to the prohibition on the retroactive applica-
tion of new rules.77 The first exception provides "that a new rule
should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of prima-
ry, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe.'" The second exception is
limited to "those new procedures without which the likelihood of
an accurate [sentence] is seriously diminished."7"
Aside from treating like cases alike, the Court justified its
strict standard on at least two other grounds. First, the Court
recognized the states' strong interest in finality.79 The Court
reasoned, "[wlithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of
much of its deterrent effect. The fact that life and liberty are at
stake in criminal prosecutions 'shows only that "conventional
notions of finality" should not have as much place in criminal as
in civil litigation, not that they should have none.'"' ° The Court
also noted the economic benefits of finality. The "costs imposed
upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of con-
stitutional law on habeas corpus... generally far outweigh the
benefits of the application."8 '
Second, the Court noted that the Teague standard comports
with the purpose of habeas review: to serve as an incentive for
trial and appellate courts to apply the constitutional standards
that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place.82
Courts cannot be asked to do any more than this.
Justice Brennan wrote a passionate and highly critical dis-
sent. With a touch of judicial realism, Brennan noted that few
Teague at 310-11 (plurality). These exceptions are discussed more fully in Section
II.C. See also text accompanying notes 108-19.
78 Id at 311.
'9 Id at 308-09.
' Id at 309, quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U Chi L Rev 142, 150 (1970). The Court also quoted Justice
Harlan at length on this point:
The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose, that is, reducing the
controversy to a final judgment not subject to further judicial revision may, quite le-
gitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ to out-
weigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in readjudicating
convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed.
Teague, 489 US at 306 (plurality), quoting Mackey v United States, 401 US 667, 683
(1971) (Harlan concurring and dissenting).
" Teague, 489 US at 310 (plurality), quoting Solem v Stumes, 465 US 638, 654
(1984).
' Teague, 489 US at 306 (plurality).
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decisions are "dictated" by prior decisions: iost such cases in-
volve a question of law that is at least debatable, permitting a
rational judge to resolve the case in more than one way." 3 Be-
cause very few cases qualify under the Court's definition as new
rules, "a great many cases could only be heard on habeas if the
rule urged by the petitioner fell within one of the two exceptions
the plurality has sketched."' And those exceptions, Justice
Brennan pointed out, are quite narrow. "The plurality's approach
today can thus be expected to contract substantially the Great
Writ's sweep."85 While Brennan said he approved of the
majority's emphasis on treating like cases alike, he criticized the
plurality's "'blind adherence'" to this ideal as "'letting the tail
wag the dog."'86 While other standards may lead to unequal
treatment of defendants, Justice Brennan maintained, "it is at
least arguably better that the wrong done to one person be right-
ed than that none of the injuries inflicted on those whose convic-
tions have become final be redressed, despite the resulting in-
equality in treatment.""
B. Clarification of the Teague Standard
Teague left many questions unanswered. In particular, com-
mentators were left to wonder about the applicability of Teague
to capital cases, 8 the scope of the two exceptions, and, most im-
portantly, what exactly constitutes a new rule.
The Court addressed these issues in subsequent cases. In
Penry v Lynaugh, the Court, over Justice Brennan's vehement
objection, extended the Teague standard to procedural rules in
capital cases.89 In the majority's view, "the finality concerns un-
derlying Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity are applicable
Teague, 489 US at 333 (Brennan dissenting).
Id at 334.
Id.
Id at 327, quoting Griffith v Kentucky, 479 US 314, 332 (1987) (White dissenting).
8 Id at 339 (Brennan dissenting). Of course, the ultimate irony of the Teague decision
is that Teague itself announced a new rule for retroactivity.
" Teague was not a capital case and, in a footnote, the Court said, "we need not, and
do not, express any views as to how the retroactivity approach we adopt today is to be ap-
plied in the capital sentencing context." Teague, 489 US at 314 n 2 (plurality).
492 US 302, 314 (1989). Justice Brennan's objection was echoed in Steven M.
Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus
Petitioners Be Able To Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 357, 401-02 (1990-91) (The Teague line of cases "will increase the likelihood that
life and death will be determined in some cases not by the merits of an individual's claims
but by the fortuities in the timing and pace of litigation which are beyond the individual's
control.").
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in the capital sentencing context, as are the two exceptions to his
general rule of nonretroactivity."0
Moreover, subsequent cases revealed sharp disagreement in
the Court over what constitutes a "new rule." At the center of
this discord has been the inability of the justices to develop a
satisfactory definition of the elusive phrase "dictated by prece-
dent." In his Teague dissent, Justice Brennan foresaw this con-
troversy."
In his Butler dissent, Justice Brennan elaborated further on
this idea. Quoting Justice Harlan, Justice Brennan saw that the
Teague concept of "dictated by precedent" is overly narrow, and
at odds with the Court's "vision of adjudication":
One need not be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to recognize
that many, though not all, of this Court's constitutional de-
cisions are grounded upon fundamental principles whose
content does not change dramatically from year to year, but
whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation
succeeds generation.2
In fact, every holding can be characterized at various levels of
generality and thus cases can be distinguished on their facts. 3
Justice Brennan's observations hold especially true for cases that
reach the Supreme Court. If the decision in a case were so clearly
"dictated" by prior precedent, the case would never even have
reached the highest Court.
Penry v Lynaugh,94 Butler v McKellar,95 and Stringer v
Black96 illustrate the Court's struggles with the definition of a
new rule. In Penry and Stringer, the Court took a narrow view of
this category and gave a broad and generous understanding to
the phrase "dictated by precedent."97 In Butler, however, the
'0 Penry, 492 US at 314.
91 See text accompanying note 83.
Butler, 494 US at 424 (Brennan dissenting), quoting Desist v United States, 394 US
244, 263 (1969) (Harlan dissenting).
See Meyer, 61 U Chi L Rev at 457 (cited in note 72).
492 US 302 (1989).
494 US 407 (1990).
503 US 222 (1992).
For a full discussion of the Court's examination of the "dictated by precedent" stan-
dard in these cases, see Meyer, 61 U Chi L Rev at 438-40, 446-48 (cited in note 72). In




Court articulated its broadest definition of "new rule" to date,
interpreting the Teague standard in such a way that almost noth-
ing could fail to qualify as a "new rule."98
The rhetoric of these decisions is as important as their hold-
ings in illustrating the disagreement among the justices. In But-
ler, Justice Rehnquist reached the conclusion that the defendant
was seeking a new rule by characterizing Teague as validating
"reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary
to later decisions."99 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a rule is
new if it arose from a case in which the outcome was "susceptible
to debate among reasonable minds.""°
Moreover, Rehnquist argued that not even a court's own
characterization of its reliance on precedent matters:
[Tihe fact that a court says that its decision is within the
'logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is
'controlled' by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes
of deciding whether the current decision is a 'new rule' un-
der Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions as being
'controlled' or 'governed' by prior opinions even where aware
of reasonable contrary conclusions reached by other
courts."'
Justice Rehnquist went even further, reasoning that a disagree-
ment among judges is evidence that something is a new rule. A
circuit split, for example, is evidence that a case is "susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds" and therefore announces a new
rule.0
2
A "new rule," for purposes of Teague, must include not only a new rule that replaces
an old one, but a new rule that replaces palpable uncertainty as to what the rule
might be ....
If Teague does not apply to a claimed "inherency" as vague and debatable as that
in the present case, then it applies only to habeas requests for plain overrul-
ing-which means that it adds little if anything to the principles already in place
concerning the retroactivity of new rules in criminal cases....
Penry, 492 US at 352-53 (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' See Meyer, 61 U Chi L Rev at 440-42 (cited in note 72). Justice Brennan again ve-
hemently dissented: "[T]he majority would label 'new' any rule of law favoring a state
prisoner that can be distinguished from prior precedent on any conceivable basis, legal or
factual." Butler, 494 US at 421 (Brennan dissenting).
" Butler, 494 US at 414. Justice Rehnquist took this language from United States v
Leon, 468 US 897, 918-19 (1984).
100 Butler, 494 US at 415.
101 Id.
" Id. In Sawyer v Smith, Justice Marshall responded to a similar argument.
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In Stringer, however, the Court backed off from Justice
Rehnquist's dicta. The State argued, on the basis of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Butler, that the Fifth Circuit's conclusion
that the petitioner sought the benefit of a new rule demonstrated
the reasonableness of the state's position. The Court, however,
rejected this argument:
The Fifth Circuit's... views are relevant to our inqui-
ry... but not dispositive. The purpose of the new rule doc-
trine is to validate reasonable interpretations of existing
precedents. Reasonableness, in this as in many other con-
texts, is an objective standard, and the ultimate decision
whether [the rule] was dictated by precedent is based on an
objective reading of the relevant cases. The short answer to
the State's argument is that the Fifth Circuit made a serious
mistake .... 03
Wright v West provided a new twist to the disagreement
among the members of the Court over the meaning of Teague.
Justice Thomas, writing for a three-judge plurality, described
Teague as establishing a "deferential" standard of review of state
court determinations of federal law.'" This notion was sharply
disputed by Justice O'Connor, however, who maintained that the
"reasonable jurist" inquiry was an objective one and not a defer-
ential standard of review. In her view, deference to state court
determinations of federal law is inconsistent with the purposes of
habeas review."5 In a separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy
refused to enter this debate, but he emphasized that Teague
established a standard for retroactivity, not a standard of re-
view."'
In its most recent Teague decisions, the Court has moved
back toward its stance in Butler, focusing on whether state court
[T]he mere fact that a single court adopts a position contrary to the one dictated by
our precedents does not confirm that the case law was unclear. Indeed, if that were
the standard, almost every Supreme Court decision would announce a new decision,
as we seldom take cases to resolve issues as to which lower courts are in universal
agreement.
497 US 227, 249-50 (1990) (Marshall dissenting).
"o Stringer, 503 US at 237.
"0 505 US 277, 291-94 (1992) (plurality).
,o See Wright, 505 US at 304 (O'Connor concurring).
106 See Wright, 505 US at 307 (Kennedy concurring). In yet another separate opinion,
Justice Souter merely concluded that the petitioner's claim was barred by Teague and
refused to go further. See Wright, 505 US at 310 (Souter concurring).
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decisions were "reasonable," but the meaning of the terms "dic-
tated by precedent" and "new rule" remains unsettled. 7
C. Teague's Exceptions
Teague recognized two exceptions under which new rules
could be applied retroactively. These exceptions have apparently
been included in the new statute. It allows a petitioner to gain an
evidentiary hearing if his claim relies on a "new rule of constitu-
tional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.... "108 The
first Teague exception provides "that a new rule should be ap-
plied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe."" The second exception is limited to
"those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accu-
rate conviction is seriously diminished.""'
The second of these exceptions provides a possible avenue for
the retroactive application of Simmons."' In Teague, Justice
O'Connor emphasized the narrow scope of this exception:
101 See Graham v Collins, 506 US 461, 477 (1993) ("[T]he determinative question is
whether reasonable jurists reading the case law that existed in 1984 could have concluded
that Graham's sentencing was not constitutionally infirm."); Gilmore v Taylor, 508 US 333
(1993).
" 28 USc § 2254(eX2). What gaining an evidentiary hearing means to the
petitioner's chances of getting relief on the basis of the "new rule" is not clear from the
statute or from the legislative history. This Comment assumes it is an important step.
The lack of clarity in § 2254(e) is just one of the statute's many flaws, a discussion of
which is beyond the scope of this Comment.
"o' See Teague, 489 US at 311 (plurality), quoting Mackey v United States, 401 US
667, 692 (1971) (Harlan concurring and dissenting). Justice O'Connor found, for example,
that the declaration as a substantive matter that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded persons fit this exception. Penry, 492 US at 314-19. The
Court has not shed any further light on this exception, and its scope is not relevant to
this Comment because it would not apply to Simmons.
11 Teague, 489 US at 313 (plurality). In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted that "a
touchstone of factual innocence would provide little guidance in certain important types of
cases, such as those challenging the constitutionality of capital sentencing hearings."
Teague, 489 US at 321 (Stevens concurring). In his dissent, Justice Brennan assumed that
the second exception must also cover sentencing determinations. "In 'limiting the scope of
the second exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished,' the plurality presumably intends the exception to
cover claims that involve the accuracy of the defendant's sentence as well as the accuracy
of a coures determination of his guilt." Teague, 489 US at 336 n 5 (Brennan dissenting)
(internal citation omitted).
'. See Teague, 489 US at 311 (plurality).
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We believe it unlikely that many such components of basic
due process have yet to emerge. We are also of the view that
such rules are best illustrated by recalling the classic
grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus-that the
proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prose-
cutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony; or that the
conviction was based on a confession extorted from the de-
fendant by brutal methods."
In Butler, Justice Rehnquist apparently adopted this exception in
death penalty cases."'
In Sawyer v Smith, Justice Kennedy, concerned about under-
mining "the principle of finality which is essential to the opera-
tion of our criminal justice system " " gave an even narrower
definition of the second exception: "A rule that qualifies under
this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also 'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to
the fairness of a proceeding.""' On that basis, Justice Kennedy
refused to define the exception to include all new rules of capital
sentencing that "preserve the accuracy and fairness of capital
sentencing judgments." He explained:
It is difficult to see any limit to the definition of the second
exception if cast as proposed by petitioner. All of our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence concerning capital sentencing is
directed toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy
in some sense. Indeed, petitioner has not suggested any
Eighth Amendment rule that would not be sufficiently
"fundamental" to qualify for the proposed definition of the
exception... ."'
In Graham v Collins, the Court appears to have extended the
second exception to rules in capital sentencing procedures."
112 Id at 313.
113 Butler, 494 US at 416, quoting Teague, 489 US at 311-13 (plurality).
114 497 US 227, 242 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
.. Id, quoting Teague, 489 US at 309, 311 (plurality).
"' Sawyer, 497 US at 242-43.
117 506 US 461, 478 (1993) (apparently accepting the extension of Teague's second
exception to capital sentencing cases, but finding that "the case at hand did not fall within
the exception"). Justice Brennan, dissenting in Saffle v Parks, offered the following justifi-
cation:
If the irrevocable nature of the death penalty is not sufficient to counsel against ap-
plication of Justice Harlan's doctrine of limited retroactivity for collateral review alto-
gether, it should at least inform the determination of the proper scope of the second
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Justices Brennan and Marshall have argued that the second
exception should encompass more than just "watershed rules of
criminal procedure,"1 ' particularly in capital cases. In Sawyer,
Justice Marshall stated, "the notion that we have already dis-
covered all procedures central to fundamental fairness is square-
ly inconsistent with our Eighth Amendment methodology, under
which 'bedrock' Eighth Amendment principles emerge in light of
new societal understandings and experience.""
In sum, the Teague line of cases creates a strong presump-
tion against retroactivity. But the Court has applied this pre-
sumption somewhat less aggressively than its language may at
first suggest. As Penry and Stringer show, the Court has at times
defined "dictated by precedent" broadly in order to give retroac-
tive effect to rules in capital cases. Moreover, Teague's second
exception, if given a broad reading, could provide another avenue
for the retroactive application of Simmons.
III. WHY SIMMONS SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
This Section will first identify the confusion surrounding the
retroactivity of Simmons, then survey the lower courts' treatment
of the retroactivity of Simmons, and finally propose two different
ways in which courts should resolve the issue in favor of retroac-
tivity.
Lower courts examining the retroactivity of Simmons have
encountered a number of problems. For instance, lower courts
have wrestled with Teague's mandate that retroactivity be treat-
ed as a threshold issue. In Teague, the Court announced that
courts should determine whether the rule sought by the defen-
dant meets the Teague retroactivity standard before deciding
whether the rule applies in the particular instance. Several lower
courts have failed to obey this edict and have first found a
defendant's claim to be outside the scope of Simmons and then
Teague exception in capital cases. Moreover, the majority's insistence that a rule
must enhance the accuracy of the factfinding process in order to fit within the second
exception is difficult to justify in the context of capital sentencing.
494 US 484, 505-06 (1990) (Brennan dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
118 Parks, 494 US at 505 (Brennan dissenting), quoting Teague, 489 US at 311.
' Sawyer, 497 US at 257 (Marshall dissenting). See also Parks, 494 US at 506 n 8
(Brennan dissenting), quoting Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 87 (1985) (Burger concurring)
("In capital cases, the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or
may not be required in other cases.").
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stated as an afterthought that even if the defendant had a valid
Simmons claim, that claim would be barred by Teague."°
In essence, those courts are making substantive judgments
about the scope of the Simmons rule, when they should not even
be reaching the substance of the claims. In a concurring opinion
in a recent Fourth Circuit case, Judge Luttig pointed out the
majority's contravention of the Supreme Court's directive and
explained two dangers of this practice.'' First, the failure to
treat retroactivity as a threshold matter "relegat[es] the Supreme
Court's decision in Teague v. Lane in this circuit to a rule of little
or no practical consequence."' Moreover,
the methodology employed by the majority gives panels of
this court license to issue what in essence are advisory opin-
ions on significant constitutional questions which, because
they are Teague-barred, are not even cognizable on federal
habeas. Here, for example, our circuit is henceforth bound by
the majority's interpretation of Simmons... when the scope
of that decision is not even properly before the court."
The lower courts that have addressed the retroactivity of
Simmons have come to quite different results. The Fifth Cir-
cuit"4 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court' have refused
to apply Simmons retroactively. The Fourth Circuit would proba-
bly not apply Simmons retroactively either." The Supreme
Court of New Mexico" and district courts in Pennsylvania,"
"2 See, for example, Johnson v Scott, 68 F3d 106, 111-12 n 11 (5th Cir 1995), cert de-
nied 64 USLW 3656 (1996) (After rejecting Johnson's claim on the merits, the court noted
that "even if Simmons applied to Johnson's case, it would still be barred by Teague.");
Allridge v Scott, 41 F3d 213, 222 n 11 (5th Cir 1994), cert denied 115 S Ct 1959 (1995)
(same).
121 Townes v Murray, 68 F3d 840, 855-56 (4th Cir 1995), cert denied 116 S Ct 831
(1996) (Luttig concurring) (citations omitted).
22 Id at 856.
"s Id.
"4 See Allridge, 41 F3d at 222 n 11 ("In addition to failing on the merits, Allridge's
Simmons claim would be barred under the non-retroactivity limitation the Supreme Court
announced in Teague v. Lane .. .") (citations omitted); Johnson, 68 F3d at 111-12 n 11;
Montoya v Scott, 65 F3d 405, 416-17 (5th Cir 1995), cert denied 64 USLW 2439 (1996).
See Commonwealth v Christy, 540 Pa 192, 656 A2d 877, 888-89 (1995).
126 See Townes, 68 F3d at 850. Because the court held that Simmons did not apply to
the facts of Townes's case (ignoring the Supreme Court's direction to deal with retroac-
tivity as a threshold issue) the court had "no occasion to determine whether Simmons
established a 'new rule' for purposes of federal habeas review and, if so, whether the rule
there announced falls within the second Teague exception." Id. The court did hold that the
"broader rule" sought by Townes should not be applied retroactively under the Teague
test. Id at 853.
See Clark v Tansy, 118 NM 486, 882 P2d 527, 531-34 (1994).
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Virginia,' and Illinois, 30 however, have all applied the rule
retroactively-and the Seventh Circuit might do so in the fu-
ture.
131
A. Why Simmons Is Not a "New Rule"
Before offering an analysis of how Simmons was compelled
by Gardner and Skipper, and thus ought to be applied retroac-
tively, it is necessary to examine-and discard-some obvious
arguments for and against the retroactivity of Simmons.
First, any argument in favor of retroactivity must overcome
Supreme Court dicta indicating that disagreement among judges
as to a rule's "newness" is sufficient evidence that the rule is
"new" for Teague purposes. According to the logic of Justice
Rehnquist's Butler dictum, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Scalia-which Justice Thomas joined-proves that Simmons was
susceptible to debate among reasonable jurists.'32
Justice Scalia's dissent does not demonstrate such a debate.
In fact, Justice Scalia acknowledges the central logic of the
plurality's opinion-that a defendant may not be sentenced to
death on the basis of information he had no opportunity to deny
or explain. What Justice Scalia does dispute, however, is whether
Simmons presents such a factual situation.13 Since Justice
Scalia's dissent was really based on factual grounds, the Court
seems to have unanimously recognized at least a narrow rule
allowing the defendant to raise parole ineligibility when the
prosecutor builds his case for death on an argument of future
dangerousness outside of prison.
Similarly, one might argue that the disagreement between
the courts that have found Simmons to be a new rule and those
that have found it not to be a new rule shows that the issue is
susceptible to debate and is, therefore, "new." The Court, howev-
Carpenter v Vaughn, 888 F Supp 658, 665-66 (M D Pa 1995).
' O'Dell v Thompson, C. No. 3:92CV480 (E D Va Sept 6 1994).
' See note 131.
.' In Stewart v Lane, the court decided not to apply Simmons retroactively because at
the time Stewart's conviction became "final," the Supreme Court had not handed down
Skipper. 60 F3d 206, 300-02 (7th Cir 1995), cert petition filed Jan 16, 1996. The Stewart
court noted: "We might have been presented with a different case if Stewart's convictions
had become final after the Supreme Court decided Skipper, because it is arguable that
Skipper compels the result in Simmons." Id at 302 n 4. In Spreitzer v Peters, the Northern
District of Illinois seized upon this very footnote to apply Simmons retroactively. 1996 US
Dist LEXIS 1189 *11-12, 13 (N D Ill).
" See Butler, 494 US at 415.
13 See text accompanying note 41.
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er, rejected this argument in Stringer, where Justice Kennedy
found that the rule at issue in that case was not new despite the
Fifth Circuit's views to the contrary.'3
Thus, the argument that any disagreement between courts or
judges means that a rule is a new rule does not preclude retroac-
tive application of Simmons. The argument that Simmons should
be applied retroactively, however, cannot rely on the reasoning of
the courts that have decided to apply it retroactively.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, for example, applied
Simmons retroactively without even making a retroactivity inqui-
ry." The Middle District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia did go through the proper Teague analysis, but
both courts based their decisions largely on the plain language of
Justice Blackmun in Simmons that "the principle announced in
Gardner was reaffirmed in Skipper, and compels our decision to-
day."1 36 Although this statement seems to provide strong evi-
dence that Simmons was compelled by Gardner and Skipper, the
Supreme Court has made clear that such statements are not dis-
positive. Recall that, in Butler, the Court specifically repudiated
this justification for the retroactive application of a rule-at least
with regard to such statements by lower court judges.3 Indeed,
one might wonder if the same analysis applies to the Supreme
Court's characterization of its own precedent.
Thus, Justice Scalia's dissent, lower court opinions denying
and permitting retroactive application of Simmons, and Justice
Blackmun's statement in Simmons are not dispositive. Ultimate-
ly, then, the retroactivity of Simmons must depend instead upon
the relationship of Simmons to Gardner and Skipper, the two
"3 See text accompanying note 103. The Court was wise to back away from Justice
Rehnquist's stance. The practice of considering the opinions of lower courts as evidence of
newness is dangerous. When these lower court opinions are taken into account, Teague
creates a vicious circle in which every rule is new. Given the Court's high standard for
retroactivity (and the Teague standard's lack of clarity), a lower court will be inclined not
to give any rule retroactive effect. If the Supreme Court then turns around and uses that
lower court's denial of retroactivity as evidence of "newness," everything will be a new
rule.
"5 See Clark v Tansy, 118 NM 486, 882 P2d 527, 531-33 (1994).
"" Carpenter v Vaughn, 888 F Supp 658, 666 (M D Pa 1995), quoting Simmons, 114 S
Ct at 2194 (emphasis added). The court in Spreitzer v Peters, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 1189,
*9-17 (N D Ill), also relied on this statement but went on to conduct a careful analysis of
the relationship of Simmons to its precedents.
,5 Butler, 494 US at 415. See also text accompanying note 102. Justice Rehnquist
argued that a court's own characterization of its reliance on precedent "is not conclusive
for purposes of deciding whether [a decision] is a 'new rule' under Teague." Id. Justice
Rehnquist made this argument about the statements of lower court judges.
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precedents upon which it chiefly relies. 8  Under Teague,
Simmons must be applied retroactively if it was compelled by
Gardner and Skipper. The holdings of Gardner and Skipper
both foreshadow Simmons.'39 In Skipper, the Court stated that
the exclusion of evidence of the defendant's good behavior in
prison during the penalty phase of his capital trial "impeded the
sentencing jury's ability to carry out its task of considering all
relevant facets of the character and record of the individual of-
fender."' In language that plainly foreshadowed Simmons, the
Court noted:
Where the prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of
future dangerousness in asking for the death penalty, it is
not only the rule of Lockett and Eddings that requires that
the defendant be afforded an opportunity to introduce evi-
dence on this point; it is also the elemental due process
requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to death "on
the basis of information which he had no opportunity to
deny or explain."'
Certainly Simmons can be distinguished from these cases on
factual grounds. But a reasonable jurist cannot deny that the
outcome of Simmons was dictated by those two cases. In both
Gardner and Simmons, the sentencer sentenced the defendant to
death on the basis of information that he was not given the op-
portunity to rebut. Skipper is based on the LockettlEddings line
of cases which mandate that in capital sentencing cases "the
sentencer [must] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigat-
ing factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
" Under the Teague analysis, the reviewing court must examine the state of the law
on the date the petitioner's conviction became final. A state conviction and sentence
become final for Teague purposes "when the availability of direct appeal to the state
courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has
elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied." Caspari v Bohlen, 114 S Ct 948,
953 (1994). Thus, if a petitioner's conviction became final in 1985, he could not argue that
Skipper, which was decided in 1986, compelled Simmons. See note 131. The new habeas
statute might alter this analysis slightly. It says nothing about looking at the state of the
law when the conviction became final. It only asks if the state court adjudication was
"reasonable." Arguably, this means that the habeas court must look at the state of the law
at the time the state post-conviction court denied relief. If this is so, then under the new
statute, the petitioner can benefit from any decisions handed down between the time his
conviction became final and the time his post-conviction relief is denied, whereas under
Teague he could not.
" Gardner, 430 US at 362.
"o Skipper, 476 US at 8.
14 Id at 5 n 1, quoting Gardner, 430 US at 362.
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any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death."' It is difficult
to read this language and yet conclude that parole evidence is not
"an aspect of the defendant's record" that the sentencer must be
allowed to consider. "Skipper not only left little doubt that a
capital defendant has the right to present his sentencer with any
and all evidence that might mitigate his punishment, but was
also very clear that testimony regarding a defendant's probable
future conduct was such evidence."'"
Policy arguments also favor the retroactive application of
Simmons. First, although the application of Teague in the capital
context is clearly established, one might wonder about the wis-
dom of this decision. Teague's policy justifications-finality and
equality-are less persuasive when a person's life is at stake. As
Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent in Penry, the extension of
Teague to capital cases
means that a person may be killed although he or she has a
sound constitutional claim that would have barred his or her
execution had this Court only announced the constitutional
rule before his or her conviction and sentence became final.
It is intolerable that the difference between life and death
should turn on such a fortuity of timing, and beyond my
comprehension that a majority of this Court will so blithely
allow a State to take a human life though the method by
which sentence was determined violates our Constitu-
tion.'
In light of this reasoning, perhaps the Court should be at least
somewhat more lenient in its application of Teague to capital
cases.
142 Skipper, 476 US at 4, quoting Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104, 110 (1982),
quoting Lockett v Ohio, 438 US 586, 604 (1978) (plurality) (emphasis in Lockett). On the
basis of this language, it is difficult to see how the Court avoided Justice Souter's Eighth
Amendment position in Simmons. Parole status would seem to be an "aspect of the
defendant's record" as contemplated by Lockett and Eddings. See text accompanying notes
33-35.
"' Spreitzer, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 1189 *14-15.
14 Penry, 492 US at 341 (Brennan dissenting).
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Second, despite fears to the contrary,' the retroactive appli-
cation of Simmons would not open the prison gates to release a
flood of our country's most violent criminals. First, those who
would benefit would only have their sentences, not their convic-
tions, reversed. These defendants would receive a new sentencing
hearing. Moreover, the number of prisoners who would receive a
new sentencing hearing is relatively small, because, as Section II
demonstrated, the lower courts have given Simmons a very nar-
row reading. Even if Simmons were given retroactive effect, ap-
parently, an inmate on death row could only prevail on a
Simmons claim if the prosecutor built his case for the death pen-
alty on the defendant's future dangerousness, the defendant was
statutorily ineligible for parole, the defense counsel preserved the
defendant's constitutional right with an objection, and the jury, of
course, was not informed of the defendant's parole status. This
point deserves emphasis: only five states-Pennsylvania, Virgin-
ia, Texas, South Carolina, and North Dakota-give the jury the
option of a life sentence without parole but do not inform the jury
about the defendant's parole ineligibility.' Thus, the retroac-
tive application of Simmons would only provide relief to a small
number of inmates in a handful of states.
Finally, not applying Simmons retroactively would mean
that prosecutorial misconduct would go unpunished. There is no
conceivable justification for a prosecutor to build his case for the
death penalty on the defendant's future dangerousness to society
at large when the prosecutor knows that the defendant will never
be paroled if given a life sentence.147
B. Why Simmons Should Be Applied Retroactively Under
Teague's Second Exception Even If It Is a "New Rule"
Even if Simmons were not compelled by prior precedent and
states a "new rule" under Teague, Simmons provides a context
for the Court to reconsider the scope of Teague's second exception
" In Commonwealth v Christy, Justice Flaherty noted, "One cannot ignore the effect
of retroactive application of Simmons to collaterally attacked sentences. Should we hold
otherwise, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that almost every death sentence imposed
in Pennsylvania would be subject to collateral attack on the basis of Simmons." 540 Pa
192, 656 A2d 877, 889 n 23 (1995), cert denied 116 S Ct 194 (1995).
' See note 53 and accompanying text.
In his Sawyer dissent, Justice Marshall made a similar point. "The state prosecu-
tr... surely could not claim a good-faith belief in the legitimacy of the conduct pro-
scribed in Caldwell-misleading and inaccurate argument designed to minimize the jury's
sentencing responsibility." 497 US at 258 (Marshall dissenting).
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and apply Simmons retroactively. This exception apparently has
been included in the new habeas statute."1 As noted above, the
second exception provides for the retroactive application of "those
new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate con-
viction is seriously diminished."' Although the Court has been
careful to emphasize the narrow scope of this exception, 50 the
Court has recognized that accurate sentencing may be included
under this exception.' 5 ' Even in the capital sentencing context,
such rules "must not only improve accuracy, but also 'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to
the fairness of a proceeding."5 '
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, however, have sug-
gested a broader understanding of the second exception-an
understanding that the Court should seriously consider. In his
Parks dissent, Justice Brennan argued that "the irrevocable na-
ture of the death penalty... should ... inform the determina-
tion of the proper scope of the second Teague exception in capital
cases."'53 Justice Brennan noted that the Supreme Court "has
consistently 'recognized that the qualitative difference of death
from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.""
In Sawyer, Justice Marshall also argued that the second excep-
tion should be broader. 55
Parks, like Simmons, dealt with possible mitigating evidence.
Justice Brennan concluded:
Rules ensuring the jury's ability to consider mitigating evi-
dence guarantee that the jury acts with full information
when formulating a moral judgment about the defendant's
conduct. Because such rules are integral to the proper func-
', See note 15 and accompanying text.
.. Teague, 489 US at 313 (plurality). See also note 110.
" See text accompanying note 112.
In rejecting the application of the second exception in Graham v Collins, 506 US
461, 478 (1993), Justice White wrote, "We do not believe that denying Graham special
jury instructions concerning his mitigating evidence of youth, family background, and
positive character traits 'seriously diminish[ed] the likelihood of obtaining an accurate
determination' in his sentencing proceeding." Id, quoting Butler, 494 US at 416 (emphasis
added).
152 Sawyer, 497 US at 242, quoting Teague, 489 US at 311 (plurality), quoting Mackey,
401 US at 693.
Parks, 494 US at 505-06 (Brennan dissenting).
'5' Id at 505, quoting California v Ramos, 463 US 992, 998-99 (1983).
Sawyer, 497 US at 257 (Marshall dissenting).
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tioning of the capital sentencing hearing, they must apply
retroactively under the second Teague exception.'
A similar argument can be made about Simmons, particular-
ly in light of the clear empirical data relating to a jury's under-
standing of "life in prison." 1' The importance of this cannot be
overstated. Withholding accurate sentencing information from
capital juries can and does influence the outcome of trials. Em-
pirical studies concerning the effect of not informing jurors that
"life" means "life without parole" have shown that a typical juror
believes that a life sentence carries with it a possibility of parole,
and, as a result, is more likely to sentence the defendant to
death.5 If inmates really sit on death row as a result of a
judge's refusal to remedy a misleading prosecutorial argument
with accurate sentencing information, then the Simmons rule
should be applied retroactively under the second exception.
CONCLUSION
The information a jury has about a defendant's parole status
can mean the difference between a life sentence and the death
penalty. In Simmons, the Supreme Court recognized this and
came to the common-sense conclusion that a prosecutor cannot
mislead a jury with an argument about the defendant's future
dangerousness when, in reality, the jury's only other sentencing
option-a life sentence-means the defendant will never again
walk the streets. Even under the Supreme Court's strict Teague
standard, codified in 28 USC § 2254(d), this rule should be ap-
plied retroactively to defendants who sit on death row as a result
of this kind of prosecutorial argument. As a legal matter,
Simmons is not a new rule of law but was plainly dictated by
Skipper and Gardner. Moreover, several policy arguments favor
retroactive application. Since lower courts have interpreted the
rule announced in Simmons narrowly, retroactive application will
not mean a flood of claims. Furthermore, prosecutors should not
go unpunished for making misleading arguments outlawed by
Simmons. Finally, a "fortuity of timing" should not make the
difference between life and death.
1S Parks, 494 US at 507.
"' See text accompanying note 2.
See note 2 and accompanying text.
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